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Comment

Meredith Corp. v. FCC: The Demise
of the Fairness Doctrine
INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of radio and television broadcasting, an
anomalous double standard has developed between the regulation of electronic and print media.' Traditional first amendment
guarantees2 have long taken a back seat to various govern3
mental regulations on broadcasters.
Early concern over the effect of unrestrained competition
for a limited number of broadcast frequencies 4 led to the establishment of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) 5 and its
successor, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission). 6 Throughout its existence, the Commission has

CompareRed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
a right to reply to personal attacks on radio/television) with Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a statute requiring newspapers to
give politicians the right to reply to editorials).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I, reading in its relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...
"
For examples of historical and current governmental regulations on broadcasters, see Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163, 1170, 1173 (1927);
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 273, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081 (1934). See also 47 C.F.R.
§ 73 (1986) (outlining rules applicable to all broadcasters); W. EMEty, BROADCASTING
AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBIUITIES AND REGULATIONS (1961) (discussing the various
types of historical controls on broadcasters).
4 Many members of Congress were concerned that the broadcast airwaves
would be abused if not regulated, including Congressman White, a sponsor of the
Radio Act of 1927, who stated "[w]e have reached the definite conclusion that the
right of all our people to enjoy this means of communication [radio] can be preserved
only by . . . the doctrine that the right of the public to service is superior to the right
of any individual. . . ." 67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (1927).
See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
6 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 273, 48 Stat. 1064.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 77

had the duty to promulgate rules for broadcast licensees 7 and
to interpret those rules in adjudicatory proceedings. 8 One such
rule is the "Fairness Doctrine," 9 which requires broadcasters

47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(r) (1982) mandate the Commission to promulgate
"from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity ... such rules and
regulations ... as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. ..."
1 47 U.S.C. at § 303(m)(2) gives licensees who make written applications a
right to an adjudicatory hearing if they are facing a penalty under FCC rules.
9 The Fairness Doctrine evolved from a set of principles premised upon the
belief that the public interest in receiving the widest possible access to differing
viewpoints is fostered by government restraints on the first amendment rights of
broadcast licensees. As early as 1929, the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) recognized
in Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32
(1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930), that
the "public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing
views." Id. at 33.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) formally outlined the modern
Fairness Doctrine obligations on broadcast licensees in its 1949 Report of Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949). The doctrine imposes a two-pronged
obligation on licensees to: 1) provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues
of public interest, and 2) afford a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of
contrasting viewpoints on these issues. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Statutory approval of the Fairness
Doctrine came with Act of Sept. 14, 1959, § 1, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) amending 47 U.S.C. § 315).
The doctrine withstood its first constitutional challenge in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court unanimously held the doctrine necessary:
in view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role
in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable
without government assistance to gain access to those frequencies for
expression of their views.
Id. at 400. The Red Lion holding, based upon "spectrum scarcity," formed the basis
for FCC action in application of the Fairness Doctrine. The FCC reaffirmed its reliance
upon Red Lion in its Fairness Report, Docket No. 19260, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974),
recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff'd sub nom., National Citizens Comm'n v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978) [hereinafter
1974 FairnessReport].
The scarcity rationale has been widely criticized, most recently in TRAC v. FCC,
- , 107 S. Ct. 3196, 96
801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, -U.S.
L.Ed 2d 684 (1987). Writing for the D.C. Circuit Court, Judge Bork reasoned that
scarcity is a "universal fact," stating further:
[i]t
is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce but it is unclear
why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way that
would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the print media.
All economic goods are scarce . .. [s]ince scarcity is a universal fact, it
can hardly explain regulation in one context and not the other.
Id. at 508.
The text of the Fairness Doctrine can be found at 47 C.F.R. at § 73.1910-.1940.
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to provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues in
their viewing area and to allow a reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. 10

The Fairness Doctrine has been widely criticized in recerit
years by various interest groups" and legal scholars,12 as well
as the FCC.' 3 In Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 14 the Commission
took a giant step toward the elimination of this doctrine by

ruling that the Fairness Doctrine no longer meets the "public
interest" standard 15 justifying intrusion upon broadcasters' first
amendment rights.
This Comment analyzes, in the context of the first amendment, the recent actions of the courts, Congress, and the FCC
in their attempts to strike a delicate balance between broadcasters' rights of uninhibited speech and the recognized need
of the public to be informed.' 6 It then examines the underlying
rationale of the FCC's decision to abandon the Fairness Doc-

, See, e.g., 1974 FairnessReport, supra note 9.
" The American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, the National Ass'n of Broadcasters, and the Public Broadcasting Service all intervened in TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d at
502, and more than fifteen private interest groups filed amicus briefs on the issue of
the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine in Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n
v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated 831 F.2d 1148 (1987), exemplifying
the intense political nature of the resolution of this issue.
32 See, e.g., Rowan, Broadcast Fairness:Doctrine, Practice,Prospects, 37 FED.
Comm. L.J. 377 (1985); Chamberlain, FCC and the First Principle of the Fairness
Doctrine: A History of Neglect and Distortion, 31 FED. CoMM. L.J. 361 (1979);
Krattenmaker & Powe, The FairnessDoctrine Today: A ConstitutionalCuriosity and
an Impossible Dream, 1985 DutE L.J. 151 (1985); Comment, The FairnessDoctrine:
Fair to Whom?, 30 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 485-521 (1981).
3 See Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985), aff'd sub nom., Radio-Television News Directors
v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness Report]. See also
Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 207, 221-26 (1982) (article co-authored by FCC Chairman, urging deregulation
of the broadcast media).
" 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987); on remand, In re Complaint of Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987); Syracuse Peace Council, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768
(1987) (adjudication ruling), petition for reconsideration denied, 3 FCC Red 2035
(1988).
11The public interest standard is the basis upon which the Fairness Doctrine
has been developed, see supra note 9. The standard is codified at 47 U.S.C. at §
309(a) and directs the FCC to consider the demands of public interest, convenience,
and necessity in granting or denying broadcast licenses.
36 See infra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
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trine and concludes that in a modern setting the Fairness Doctrine is no longer a justifiable intrusion upon the constitutional
17
guarantees to broadcasters as members of the press.
I.

A.

DISSENSION IN THE RANKS

The FCC's Reluctance to Step Forward

Rumblings of dissatisfaction with the Fairness Doctrine were
heard by the courts1 8 and the FCC 19 long before the decision
21
in Meredith" and the accompanying 1987 Fairness Report.
The Commission concluded in the 1985 Fairness Report that
the doctrine was suspect "as a matter of both policy and

constitutional law.'

'22

Questioning its authority to eliminate the

doctrine, however, the Commission deferred to Congress for
guidance.23
Since an administrative agency does not have the authority

to rescind a Congressional enactment, 24 the FCC's eagerness to
eliminate the doctrine was dampened somewhat by the debate
over whether Congress had codified the doctrine in 1959 when

section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 was
amended. 25 While the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,26 upheld the Fairness Doctrine on first amend-

17

See infra notes 53-112 and accompanying text.

1 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.ll (1984).
19See, e.g., 1974 FairnessReport, supra note 9.
20Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21 Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 2 FCC Rcd 5272 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Fairness Report], petition for
reconsideration denied, 3 FCC Rcd 2050 (1988); see infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
22 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 246.
2 The FCC stated in its 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 247, "[b]ecause
of the intense Congressional interest in the fairness doctrine and the pendency of
legislative proposals (seeking to eliminate the doctrine), we have'determined that it
would be inappropriate at this time to eliminate the fairness doctrine."
24 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974).
2
See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (amending
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1952)).
26 395

U.S. 367 (1969).
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ment grounds, 27 some question was left by its ambiguous holding
28
that the 1959 amendment "ratified" the doctrine.
The FCC's dilemma was solved in TRAC v. FCC.29 The
court, faced with an FCC decision not to apply the Fairness
Doctrine to a new technology known as teletext communications, ruled that the doctrine is not a binding statutory obligation. 30 A reading of the legislative history of the
3
Communications Act and the subsequent 1959 amendment '
supports the circuit court's ruling. Despite a compelling dissent
in TRAC by Judge Mikva, 32 it seems clear that Congress'
intention in 1959 was to codify only the "equal time" doctrine,
relating to political advertising. 33 The Fairness Doctrine was
merely mentioned in the context of a concern that these new
statutory rules would not displace any obligations a broadcaster
34
might otherwise have under the Fairness Doctrine.
The decision in TRAC, combined with a history of judicial
deference to FCC discretion in the application of the Fairness
Doctrine,35 leaves no doubt that the doctrine is indeed an administrative policy. Therefore, the FCC has authority to reev-

2,Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 385, where the court stated "[w]hen Congress ratified the FCC's
implication of a fairness doctrine in 1959, it did not, of course, approve every past
decision or pronouncement by the Commission on this subject, or give it a completely
free hand for the future. The statutory authority does not go that far."
29 TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1986).
30 Id. at 518.
, For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of this Act, see TRAC,
806 F.2d at 1116-20 (Mikva, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing).
32

Id.

The "equal time" provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982) require broadcasters
to allow political candidates equal access to the airwaves. This rule prevents slanted
media coverage from prejudicially impacting candidates' campaigns. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113-14 n.12 (1973);
see also Annotation, Political Candidate'sRight to Equal Broadcast Time Under 47
USCS § 315, 35 A.L.R. Fed. 856 (1986).
1,See Columbia, 412 U.S. at 113-14 n.12.
31 Courts are generally unwilling to question an administrative agency's discretion in implementing its own policies unless the agency's action was "arbitrary and
capricious." For example, see American Security Council v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 44748 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980) (quoting Columbia, 412 U.S..
at 102, in which the court stated "[w]e are mindful that the Commission's task in
administering the fairness doctrine is one of great delicacy and difficulty, and that
the Commission's experience in this matter accordingly is entitled to 'great weight' ").
3

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 77

aluate its policy in light of the public interest standard 6 and
eliminate the doctrine "[i]f time and changing circumstances
reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by application of
' 37

the regulations. 1
B.

Attempts by Congress to Codify the Doctrine
Contrary to past attempts by Congress to declare the Fair-

ness Doctrine null and void,38 a new movement swept in on the
heels of the TRAC decision.39 Congress had already expressed
to the FCC the need to reevaluate the administrative techniques

used in enforcement of the doctrine 4Oin light of the Commission's 1985 Fairness Report conclusion that the doctrine, as

presently enforced, "chilled" broadcasters' speech.4 1
Bills seeking to codify the Fairness Doctrine were introduced in both the House 42 and the Senate43 in reaction to the
tone of the FCC's recent actions. The final Senate version of
the bill, entitled "Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987," 44 was

passed on June 3, 1987. 41 The purpose of the Act was to modify
section 315(a) of the 1934 Communications Act to affirmatively

46
require broadcast licensees to abide by the Fairness Doctrine,

effectively ending the FCC's discretion to apply the doctrine.

3 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
11National Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943).
31See, e.g., S. 22, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); S. 1038, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); S. 22, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
1"See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
40 In the 1986 Appropriations Act, Congress directed the FCC to hold public
hearings in order to examine alternate methods of administering and enforcing the
Fairness Doctrine, and to report to them by Sept. 30, 1987. 132 CONG. REC. H10619
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986); see also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863; 873 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 1987); on remand, In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd
5043 (1987); Syracuse Peace Council, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (1987) (adjudication ruling),
petition for reconsiderationdenied, 3 FCC Rcd 2035 (1988).
11 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 184-85.
,1 H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
41S, 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
- Id. at § 1.
" The House passed the Senate version of the bill by a voice vote on June 3,
1987. See 133 CONG. REc. H4139-60 (daily ed. June 3, 1987). The Senate had already
passed the bill on April 21, 1987. See 133 CONG. REc. S5218-32 (daily ed. April 21,
1987).
41S. 742, supra note 43 at § 1.
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The President's veto of this bill, 47 however, stopped the
drive to codify the doctrine. 48 Relying on the FCC's findings
in its 1985 Fairness Report, 49 the President concluded that such

a law could not withstand a constitutional challenge under the
first amendment. 50 Following this veto the debate focused on
the development of alternate methods of administration and
enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine5 and on the resolution
52
of Meredith on remand.

II. A BOLD NEW INITIATIVE
A.

Alternate Methods of Administration

In response to Congress' directive, the Commission undertook a comprehensive evaluation of alternate methods of en-

forcing fairness obligations upon broadcast licensees.5 3 The
Commission had already determined in its 1985 Fairness Report 54

41 President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23
Comp. PRus. Doe. 715 (June 19, 1987) [hereinafter Message].
,1 Instead of attempting to override the veto, the veto message was referred to
the Senate Commerce Committee on June 23, 1987. 1 Cong. Index (CCH), 100th
Cong., 20,503.
49 See Message, supra note 47, at 715.
50 Id. at 716.
" See Meredith, 809 F.2d at 873 n.ll; see also supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
52 See Meredith, 809 F.2d 863.
" See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 2 FCC Rcd 1532 (1987); 1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21.
1' The 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, was initiated by the FCC in response
to the Supreme Court's ruling in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984). In League, the Court upheld the "spectrum scarcity" justification for the
regulation of broadcasters, noting, however, that this rationale was widely criticized.
The Court stated "[wie are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding
[sic] approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological
developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast
regulation may be required." Id. at 377 n.1l.
The Court further recognized that the FCC had tentatively concluded the fairness
rules disserved the public interest, and that "were it to be shown by the Commission
that the fairness doctrine '[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing'
speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision
in that case." Id. at 379 n.12 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 393 (1969)).
Thus, through the 1985 Fairness Report, the Commission apparently attempted
WEEKLY
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that the present system of case-by-case evaluation of fairness

complaints 55 was outdated in light of modern technological

developments, the doctrine's propensity to inhibit rather than
enhance issue coverage, and the economic and political costs
56
associated with administration of the doctrine.
The goal of the Fairness Doctrine is to foster "uninhibited,
robust, wide-open" debate on controversial issues.5 7 Thus, the
Commission set forth the following criteria for judging the

various alternatives presented: 1) the alternative must further
the basic goals of the Fairness Doctrine;58 and 2) the public
benefits flowing from that alternative must outweigh the gov-

ernmental intervention it imposes upon journalistic freedom.5 9
These standards demonstrate awareness of the balancing act
demanded by any intrusion into first amendment rights.60 The
similarity between this approach and the Supreme Court's anal-

to "signal" the Court that the constitutional basis of the doctrine was in question
because of the "chilling effect" it had upon broadcasters' speech. 1985 Fairness
Report, supra note 13, at 169-88.
" The FCC first examined fairness complaints only at the time of license
renewal. See, e.g., The Channel 7 Co., 40 FCC 485 (1959). The Commission abandoned this approach, however, in the 1960s and began evaluating fairness complaints
on a case-by-case basis. 1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5273. For the rationale
behind this decision see Letter to Honorable Oren Harris, 3 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 163
(Sept. 20, 1963).
The case-by-case evaluation process is fully set forth in Applicability of the
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40
FCC 598 (1964), and the Broadcast Procedure Manual, 49 FCC 2d 1, 5 (1974).
56 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 225.
57 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 21, at 5274 (quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
11 Id. at 5275. The Commission recognized that the basic goal of the Fairness
Doctrine is "to ensure that 'the public [has] suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.' " Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S.
367, 390).
11 Id. The Commission recognized that Congress, in the 1934 Communications
Act, intended broadcasters to have "wide journalistic freedom." Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973)).
60 The rights set forth in the first amendment are not absolute. When determining whether the government has a sufficient justification to impinge upon these rights,
the need for freedom of expression in each case must be weighed against the need to
limit that expression. A limitation must not be any greater than is necessary to fulfill
its purpose. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984); see also M.
NIMMER, NimMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03 (1984).
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ysis when faced with content-based restrictions on free
expression 61 was no doubt intentional.
Using the criteria stated above, the Commission evaluated
proposals to: 1) abandon their case-by-case approach to enforcement; 62 2) substitute some type of public access program,
allowing the interested public free time to comment on the
air; 63 3) delete a number of applications of the doctrine; 64 4)

61 Courts generally use a "strict scrutiny" approach in reviewing content-based
government regulations that impinge on first amendment rights, requiring that they
serve a "compelling" government interest and are the "least restrictive means" of
protecting that interest. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
The Commission's criteria closely track this standard of review and indicate the
Commission's awareness of "the obligation ... to construe its enabling statute in a
constitutional manner." Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH, 3 FCC
Rcd 2035, 2040 n.39 (1988).
62 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 21, at 5276. See also supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
63 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 21, at 5278. Several access proposals were
submitted to the Commission, under which a broadcaster would be required to set
aside a certain amount of time for interested members of the public to discuss
controversial issues. These proposals were rejected by the Commission because they
completely divested the broadcast licensee of his discretion in programming during
these periods of access time. The Commission reasoned that "the government would
continue to play a significant, if not extensive, role in supervising a regime that would
diminish even further the journalistic freedoms of broadcasters under the First Amendment." Id. at 5282.
- Among the various applications suggested for repeal were the "personal attack
rule," the "Cullman Doctrine," and the second prong of the Fairness Doctrine. The
Commission also heard arguments to strengthen the first prong of the doctrine. Id.
at 5284.
The "personal attack rule" is outlined in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1987). It requires
a licensee to contact a person or group whose "honesty, character, integrity or like
personal qualities" have been attacked, and offer them an opportunity to respond.
Id. at § 73.1920(a). The Commission saw review of this rule as beyond the scope of
the proceedings, and declined comment upon its repeal. 1987 FairnessReport, supra
note 21, at 5285.
The "Cullman Doctrine" is based upon Cuilman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 40 FCC
576 (1963), which outlined situations when a broadcaster is required to allow unpaid
air time for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. The Commission concluded
that the elimination of the Cullman Doctrine would remove only part of the chilling
effect of the fairness doctrine, and thus was not the best alternative available. 1987
FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5287.
Further alternatives in this area were considered, the conclusions of the Commission being specifically set forth in the Report, id. at 5287-90.
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adopt a marketwide approach to enforcement; 6- 5) discontinue

enforcement
enforcement
experimental
Any one

of the doctrine only in larger markets; 66 6) limit
to television broadcasts; 67 and 7) implement an
moratorium on enforcement. 68
of these proposals could form the basis of a

lengthy commentary; for discussion purposes it will suffice to
say that although most are viable alternatives, none was ruled
the best method of furthering the goals of the Federal Com-

munications Act in "preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas." ' 69 The Commission's recommendation to Congress,
therefore, was the deregulation of the broadcast marketplace
through the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine. 70 In light of
the inherent weaknesses of the doctrine, 71 this approach en-

65 1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5290. The marketwide approach to
administration would allow a licensee whose programming was challenged under the
fairness doctrine to show compliance by proof that the issue was covered in reasonable
depth in the market he operates in as a whole. The Commission saw merit in this
approach, even though it was not adopted. Advantages include the fact that this
approach takes into account viewers' access to a variety of signals in a given market
and involves less intrusion into editorial discretion. Id. at 5290-92.
"Id. at 5292. This approach was premised on the assumption that larger
markets carry with them access to a greater number of signals. Thus, it was reasoned,
the scarcity rationale of Red Lion does not hold true for these markets but may still
be valid in smaller markets with limited access to varied programming options. Id. at
5292-93.
The Commission, however, reasoned that its findings in the 1985 FairnessReport
demonstrated the doctrine was undesirable in all markets, and that elimination in only
larger markets did not resolve the chilling effect the doctrine has on all broadcast
licensees, regardless of geographic location. Id.
67 Id. at 5293. Elimination of the constraints on radio broadcasters only was
urged, based upon the significant increase in the number of radio stations since the
doctrine's inception and the resulting end of "spectrum scarcity" in this facet of the
industry. The Commission accepted this alternative, stating "[t]here is, therefore,
little, if any, justification to continue fairness doctrine regulation . . . particularly in
view of the significant, adverse, constitutional implications of that regulation . . .
Id. at 5294.
But see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
6, 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 21, at 5294. A moratorium was suggested
in order to allow the Commission to gather information on the effect of the elimination
of the doctrine on the public interest in receiving the widest possible access to
information. Id.
69 1974 FairnessReport, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390);
1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5294-95.
70 1987 Fairness Report, supra note 21, at 5295.
7' See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
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hances the public's right of access to diverse viewpoints, while
leaving undisturbed the journalistic
freedom of broadcasters
72
outlined in the first amendment.
Deregulation does not destroy the concept that the public
should have available the broadest range of opinions from
which it can shape its own values. Rather, a free electronic
press can disseminate a wide variety of opinion, unfettered by
the fear of government sanction. 73 The public's right to complain about the coverage of an issue will remain in its freedom
to change the station, regulating the broadcasters through natural, economic oversight. 74
B. Meredith Corp. v. FCC
On the same day the Commission released its 1987 Fairness
Report, it considered the constitutional implications of a Fairness Doctrine violation. 75 The Commission had cited Meredith
Corp., the licensee of television station WTVH, in Syracuse,
New York, for failure to provide balanced news coverage of a
controversial nuclear test facility. 76 Meredith filed for reconsideration, based on the 1985 Fairness Report findings that were
released shortly after the Commission's ruling in the
case, but
77
the Commission refused to reconsider its decision.
Meredith sought judicial review in the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals. 7 The court ruled that the Commission had correctly implemented the Fairness Doctrine, but that its failure
to address Meredith's constitutional claims was arbitrary and
capricious. 79 The case was remanded to the Commission with
an express directive from the court to address the constitutional

1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5294-95.
See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 12.
74 See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, supra note 13.
71 See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
76 Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 865-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987); on remand,
In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (Aug. 6, 1987); Syracuse
Peace Council, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,768 (FCC Aug. 24, 1987) (adjudication ruling), petition
for reconsiderationdenied, 3 FCC Rcd 2035 (1988).
Meredith, 809 F.2d at 867-68.
7' Id. at 868.
Id. at 874.
72

71
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issues emanating from the application of the Fairness Doctrine. 0

An administrative agency does not have the power to determine the constitutional validity of a law. 81 Therefore, it must
be clearly understood that the FCC's determination of this
issue, although based upon constitutional principles, is not a
2
judicial finding, but a policy reassessment.
The FCC has the authority to rescind its own policies.

3

The accompanying constitutional issues84 must be addressed
because the public interest standard in the Communications Act

"invites reference to First Amendment principles ' 8 5 when applying, and thus when reviewing, the Fairness Doctrine. 86 Since
the Commission itself had formally questioned the validity of
the doctrine under this standard,8 7 it could not refuse to respond to Meredith's direct challenge of the doctrine on the
88
same grounds.

In the FCC's memorandum opinion and order filed in Meredith,89 the Fairness Doctrine was ruled unconstitutional on its
face. 90 The Commission declined to limit this ruling to the facts
of Meredith, stating that the constitutional infirmity "goes to

80 Id.
1,
12

Id. at 872 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)).

Id. at 872-73.

11The Commission is charged with the duty to consider the demands of public
interest, convenience, and necessity when implementing the Communications Act. 47
U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988). Therefore, the Commission must eliminate past methods of
implementation proven to be contrary to the public interest. See Meredith, 809 F.2d
at 874.
14 See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5043.
The
Commission states that:
[a]s we began to examine the policy issues [behind the fairness doctrine],
however, it became evident to us that the policy and constitutional
considerations in this matter are inextricably intertwined and that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the policy considerations
from the constitutional aspects underlying the doctrine.
Id. at 5046.
11 Id. (quoting Columbia, 412 U.S. at 112).
86 Columbia, 412 U.S. at 122-32.
87 See, e.g., 1985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 225.
11 Meredith, 809 F.2d at 874.
89Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5043.
90Id. at 5043, 5047.
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the very heart of the enforcement of the fairness doctrine as a
general matter." 91
The Commission reasoned that the Fairness Doctrine in
application disserves the very public interest the FCC is obligated to uphold. 92 This disservice stems from the "chilling
effect' 93 the doctrine has upon both broadcasters' speech 94 and
the free flow of diverse viewpoints to the public. 95 Present
technology has greatly increased the number of informational
outlets available to the public. 96 Therefore, past justifications
set forth by Congress in the 1927 Radio Act, 97 and by the
Supreme Court in Red Lion,9 no longer support the conclusion
that the doctrine serves a "substantial government interest." 9 9
Not only is the Fairness Doctrine unjustifiable, it has become "an excessive and unnecessary government intervention
into the editorial processes of broadcast journalists.' 100 Lesser
first amendment rights for broadcasters based on a scarcity
rationale are no longer constitutionally valid. 10' A free marketplace of ideas demands that any content-based regulation be a
"precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest. "102 Therefore, strict scrutiny of the Fairness Doctrine is
necessary if the rights of broadcasters are to be returned to
their proper level of recognition.
Application of this standard of review to the Fairness Doctrine supports the FCC's ruling in Meredith. Public interest in
access to diverse and conflicting viewpoints is indeed "compel-

"

Id. at 5047.
See supra notes 9 and 14 and accompanying text.
911985 FairnessReport, supra note 13, at 170-71.
92

94See

Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5049-50, where the Commission

found evidence of pervasive self-censorship by broadcasters to avoid Fairness Doctrine

complaints.
91See id. at 5050, wherein the Commission upheld its 1985 Fairness Report

conclusions that the doctrine effectually inhibits the expression of controversial issues
through the reluctance it causes in broadcasters to step into controversy.

See id. at 5051.
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
9-395 U.S. 367, 396-401; see also supra note 9.
" See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378.
'0 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5052.
"1 See supra note 98.
102Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
9
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ling." 103 However, the overbroad application of Fairness Doctrine obligations through the use of government oversight is
not the least restrictive means available to further this interest.'0 The courts and Congress should take heed of the FCC's
detailed analysis in both its 1987 Fairness Reportlos and Meredith.I06 The Commission's recommendation to end the Fairness
Doctrine,10 7 and thus the anomalous double-standard between
broadcasters and the print media, l08 definitively balances the
right of free speech and a free press with the right of uninhibited access to information under the first amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Fairness Doctrine, like mandatory busing, is no longer
a necessary evil. In Meredith Corp. v. FCC, the court recognized this fact after forty years of government intrusion into
the first amendment rights of broadcast licensees.' 9 The recommendation of the Commission to Congress in its 1987 Fairness Report is the equalization of broadcast journalists with
their print counterparts, by ending government oversight through
0
the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine."
Freedom from governmental intrusion will foster the growth
of a media that responds to the informational needs of the
public because of economic necessity, not fear of sanction."'
Thus, the recent actions of the FCC are the beginning of a
change that is long overdue. Courts should closely review any
governmental restrictions on first amendment rights, including

103

Id.

Strict scrutiny requires that the means of promoting the "compelling" interest
have a "tight fit" to that interest. Thus, by requiring the method that is the least
restrictive-in other words, has the "tightest fit" to the promoted interest-the Court
ensures that the government has critically examined all possible methods of promoting
its interest; see supra note 61.
103Supra note 21 and accompanying text.
106809 F.2d at 873 n.l1.
104

Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5057.
-00Id. at 5058.
'0
The first restraints on broadcasters can be found in the Radio Act of 1927,
ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
110See 1987 FairnessReport, supra note 21, at 5294-95.
' See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 13, at 221-26.
'
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content-based governmental restraints on basic first amendment
12
rights of broadcasters.
Donna J. Schoaff

MzSee,

e.g., TRAC v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

